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Introduction 
Both the political and the security future of the Balkans are highly dependent 
on the situation in the newly created state of Kosovo. After the ethnic Alba-
nian leadership declared unilateral independence in February 2008 without 
providing the Serbian minority with a durable solution, the international 
community somehow ignored consideration of the scenarios the Albanian de-
cision might have on the Balkan region marking “a turning point in interna-
tional politics.”1 While having in mind that “subject peoples must be prepared 
for political independence before being granted it,”2 this article analyzes the 
conundrums and possible complications that Kosovo’s independence may 
cause. The current situation, characterized by unviable political, economic, 
and social components, can easily generate new violence, both within the bor-
ders of Kosovo and in its neighboring countries. I will examine three possible 
scenarios. First, the Serbian minority, accounting for less than 8 percent of 
Kosovo’s total population,3 which has not yet openly expressed itself, may 
decide to claim autonomy and develop even stronger links with Serbia. Se-
cond, Albanians living in Macedonia, accounting officially for 25.2 percent 
and unofficially close to 40 percent of the total population,4 may demand 
secession from the former Yugoslav republic and unite with Kosovo or Alba-
                                                      
1 P. Schwartz, “The case of Kosovo: ‘Self-Determination’ as an instrument of imperialist 
policy,” retrieved 5 April 2008, from: http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/ feb2008/koso-f20.shtml. 
2 C. R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 96. 
3 The CIA: The World Factbook 2008 divides the population of Kosovo to Albanians (92%) 
and other (8%). 
4 For the first estimate, see the CIA: The World Factbook 2008 and, for the second, see B. 
Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 385. 
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nia, or both, if the idea of creating Greater Albania (dating back to the 1878 
League of Prizren)5 is to be followed. Third, as long as post-Dayton Bosnia is 
a weak state with an underperforming economy and a malfunctioning multi-
ethnic society, Serbs living in Republika Srpska, one of two entities of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, may decide to support Serbs from Kosovo and thus vote on 
secession from Bosnia and link to Serbia—a difficult, but possible project.  
Thus, this article aims at exploring discourses and linkages between 
Serbs, Albanians, and internationals, their production, and the historical mo-
mentum in a political consciousness. Moreover, it aims at understanding un-
der what conditions all actors concerned should act as a positive driving force 
to master a problem. Attention is paid to conflict minimization between ideo-
logically different groups and therefore under what circumstances they might 
cooperate. 
Serbs in Kosovo: What Next? 
The first argument considers the Serbian majority inhabiting northern Ko-
sovo. This majority has rejected independence of the province to such an ex-
tent that it would be ready to claim autonomy and link itself to Serbia. In their 
analysis, Marcelo Kacowicz and Pawel Lutomski argue that after the human-
itarian intervention in 1999, the final status of Kosovo became a major issue 
of discussion, and it was the Serbian government which encouraged the “re-
turn of Serbs to strategic locations, particularly in northern Kosovo, as a 
means for eventual partition.”6 Thus, Serbian denial of independence was an 
expected reaction. In his attempt to warn the European Union and the United 
States of America, Boris Tadić, the Serbian President, while speaking at the 
security conference in Munich, called on everybody to “be very careful about 
cutting corners … [and] remain vigilant of the dangers of expediency and take 
seriously the strategic priorities we all share.”7 Such a position finds its justifi-
cation in a study offered by Christopher Layne who argues that “because of 
Kosovo’s historical and cultural importance to them, Serbs view Kosovo as an 
                                                      
5 Albanian political movement focused on protecting the Albanian-inhabited territories from 
being taken away by Slavic countries in the Balkans and unifying Albanian lands under the 
Ottoman Empire. See D. Kostovicova, Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 31. 
6 M. A. Kacowicz and P. Lutomski, Population Resettlement in International Conflict: A 
Comparative study (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 91. 
7 K. Gehmlich, “Serbia warns EU of ‘cutting corners’ over Kosovo,” retrieved 15 April 2008, 
from: http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL088837320080209? 
sp=true. 
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integral part of their nation, and hence they reject ethnic Albanian demands 
for independence and are unwilling to give up the province.”8  
Therefore, in November 2007, Serbian officials proposed a Hong Kong 
model based on “one country, two systems” policy for Kosovo, but the Ko-
sovo Albanian leadership rejected the idea, seeing it as inappropriate. In his 
statement delivered on 5 November 2007, Vojislav Koštunica, Serbian Prime 
Minister at the time, stipulated:  
 
Stability, sustainability, and functionality of the model applied in the 
case of Hong Kong emanate from the fact that the agreement was 
reached through negotiations, while recognizing a fundamental prin-
ciple underpinning the modern international order, and that is respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity of internationally recognized 
states. Equally, the case of Hong Kong is a good example showing 
that a stable and good solution can by no means be arrived at through 
unilateral actions but only through negotiations and only provided 
there is respect for the UN Charter and its fundamental principles. 
The moment unilateral steps take place is the very moment when sta-
bility, sustainability, and, along with them, every kind of functionality 
disappear and when chronic hotbeds emerge instead, the crisis exac-
erbates and a serious instability is created.9  
 
Under the Hong Kong model, Kosovo, as partly independent, would have 
been allowed to join international organizations, enjoy independent political 
decision-making, and establish economically and politically competitive re-
gimes in order to attract direct foreign investment and work towards economic 
growth and capital accumulation. This way, Kosovo would enjoy its taxation 
sovereignty. But considering that this model was rejected, further analysis 
offers three indicators regarding the eventual Serbian reaction to Kosovo’s 
independence. First, on 11 December 2007 the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo 
and Metohija opened a parallel government section in the ethnically divided 
town of Mitrovica. In his report, Vitalino Canas noted that the goal of the 
Serbian government was  
 
                                                      
8 C. Layne, Christopher, “Miscalculations and blunders lead to war,” in T. Carpenter, ed., 
NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 
2000), 12. 
9 V. Koštunica, “Statement given at the fourth round of direct talks in Vienna,” retrieved 1 
January 2008, from: www.kim.sr.gov.yu. 
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to coordinate the parallel structures in the Serb-majority areas. Bel-
grade officials pay regular visits to Serb-dominated municipalities. 
Belgrade also has plans to invest in a number of economic projects in 
those areas, and to push for the creation of new municipalities and the 
establishment of new institutions. It is encouraging Kosovo Serbs to 
quit positions in Kosovo’s central and local institutions.10  
 
This approach, originally aimed at supporting local Serbs, became a mat-
ter for the UN to criticize as an open provocation. According to Joachim 
Ruecker, the UNMIK Chief, the office in Mitrovica signified “an open provo-
cation by the Serbian government to the Kosovo and international institu-
tions.”11 Similarly, Fatmir Sejdiu, the Kosovo President, stated that running 
such an office in Mitrovica “is unacceptable and not in keeping with the ex-
isting laws referring to the territorial integrity of Kosovo and the activities of 
international and local institutions in that sphere.”12 As a consequence, the 
difference between Serbian and Albanian positions resulting from popular 
support on one side or the other may contribute to further antagonism, vio-
lence, and conflict. Discussing popular support, one scholar noted the im-
portance of “belief in the cause [of conflict]” which is “a belief in its right-
ness, in its justice,” whereas both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo “strongly 
resented the injustices” before the conflict in 1998.13  
Second, the opening of the office in Mitrovica was followed by the estab-
lishment of the Serbian assembly in May 2008. Although the UN and Ko-
sovo’s government objected to its legal character, the assembly was aimed at 
helping coordination with Serbian leadership in Belgrade. As the BBC re-
ported, Slobodan Samardžić, Serbian Minister for Kosovo at the time, claimed 
that “the assembly would help Serbia fight to keep Kosovo,” an opinion 
strongly opposed by Fatmir Sejdiu for whom the existence of the assembly is 
“an attempt to destabilize Kosovo.”14 Thus, creating alternative ad hoc institu-
                                                      
10 V. Canas, “Kosovo and the Future of Balkan Security,” retrieved 5 May 2008, from: 
http://www.nato-pa.int/default.Asp?SHORTCUT=1480. 
11 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, “Ruecker, Sejdiu criticize opening 
of office in Mitrovica,” retrieved 6 July 2008, from: http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Bilteni/Engleski/ 
b121207_e.html#N21. 
12 Ibid. 
13 D. Smith, “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” in A. Austin, M. Fischer and N. Ropers, 
eds., The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 
2003), 11. 
14 BBC News (2008), “Kosovo Serbs launch new assembly,” retrieved 12 August 2008, from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7478865.stm. 
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tions can easily generate new forms of competition and violence—a problem 
even more accentuated in the case of Kosovo due to the existence of Serbian 
enclaves. 
In fact, the third and most alarming issue regards the Serbian enclaves in 
the province which are still fully politically and economically integrated with 
Serbia, thus questioning their integration within independent Kosovo. In the 
enclaves “no one holds a steady job; the communities rely on handouts from 
aid organizations and from Belgrade.”15 Moreover, William Crotty analyzes 
enclaves, where frustration is a dominant feature, by claiming that enclaves 
invite violence in order to level the playing field in the society. The ghettoi-
zation of Serbs in Kosovo has intensified resolve against compromise and cast 
doubt on any credible claim by Albanian Kosovars that Serbs will be treated 
in more enlightened ways than Albanian ethnics were treated in the prewar 
period.16 The existence of enclaves has represented an obstacle for crisis 
settlement. This argument corresponds to the idea that the main reason for the 
failure to produce long-term effects lies in the fact that the original dispute is 
completely unresolved. If the enclaves opted to link themselves to Serbia—a 
highly questionable ambition due to their position within the Kosovo prov-
ince—such a decision would contribute to the intensification of the original 
dispute.  
The above issues point out that the Serbian responsibility is to encourage 
Serbs willing to remain in an independent Kosovo to work towards greater 
inclusion and representation in the society, instead of following what Bel-
grade officials have to suggest—usually something which marginalizes them 
even more. However, it is expected that Belgrade is concerned regarding the 
future of the Serbs in independent Kosovo, but at the same time, “its behavior 
has done little either to strengthen its case for keeping Kosovo in the fold or to 
ready its citizens for the impending loss of their southern province.”17 By 
threatening violence, Serbs in Kosovo have nothing to gain. The situation in 
Mitrovica is still problematic: “The city is a microcosm of the province itself: 
its northern part is de facto Serb territory, with Serbian flags lining the streets 
and hundreds of posters of Vojislav Šešelj, a radical Serb leader and accused 
                                                      
15 C. A. Kupchan, “Independence for Kosovo,” retrieved 10 August 2008, from: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20051101facomment84603/charles-a-kupchan/ 
independenceforkosovo.html. 
16 W. J. Crotty, Democratic Development and Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective 
(Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2005), 449. 
17 C. A. Kupchan, op.cit. 
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war criminal currently in jail in the Hague.”18 Such a situation suggests that 
the idea of partition of the province is still significant to some people.  
However, when discussing the status of Kosovo, Western politicians 
agreed to exclude the idea of partition. Partition itself “rarely solves the prob-
lem, but merely creates new minorities while violating the territorial integrity 
of existing units.”19 Moreover, partition has usually been followed by forced 
population transfers, with loss of life. Accordingly, Michael Steiner, the third 
UNMIK Chief, also publicly disapproved of the possibility of a Kosovo parti-
tion along ethnic lines, placing significant emphasis on the creation of a multi-
ethnic society.20 The reason why ethnic partition of Kosovo would be 
problematic is because Serbs are chiefly settled only in the north-east area of 
the province, in northern Mitrovica and three attached municipalities. This 
amounts to only one third of the Serbian minority population. The other two 
thirds are dispersed across the province and would need extra protection. With 
the process of partition they could be located in an Albanian part, and their 
position would become even more precarious. The regional stability process 
does not favor partition, either, because of the border changes of the province 
which could provide a motive for redrawing borders elsewhere in the re-
gion—Serbia would be affected, the Slav Muslims living in Sandžak could 
ask for independence, Bosnian Serbs living in Republika Srpska could ask to 
join Serbia. In addition, another attempt to divide Kosovo followed the inde-
pendence proclamation, when Serbian leadership, as reported by the New 
York Times on 25 March 2008, “proposed dividing newly independent Ko-
sovo along ethnic lines, a move that was immediately rebuffed by Kosovo’s 
ethnic Albanian leadership in Priština.”21 
Another fact worth considering is the Albanian minority in Serbia, ac-
counting for over 60,000 people, and predominantly inhabiting the southern 
part of the republic.22 It could react the same way as Serbs in Kosovo may do 
                                                      
18 R. Flottau, “A hot summer in the Balkans: Will Serbs declare independence from Kosovo?,” 
retrieved 14 June 2008, from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-
496481,00.html.  
19 M. Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 19. 
20 M. Steiner, “Southeastern Europe: Steiner says no return of Kosovo to Serbian rule,” 
retrieved 15 May 2005, from: http://www.rferl.org/newline/2002/06/4-See/see260602.asp. 
21 D. Bilefsky, “Serbia Formally Proposes Ethnic Partition of Kosovo,” retrieved 5 July 2008, 
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/world/europe/25kosovo.html?fta=y. 
22 The Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i Stanova 
2002; Knjiga 1: Nacionalna ili etnička pripadnost po naseljima (Belgrade: Statistical Office of 
the Republic of Serbia, 2003). 
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and advocate autonomy. History suggests that young nations inhabiting a rel-
atively small and limited territory but with a high demographic growth, like 
Albania, tend to augment and claim the neighboring territory, through war, 
migration and then secession. If the neighboring nation, living in a compara-
tively large territory, is tired and relatively old with low demographic growth, 
like the Serbs, the situation is ripe for instability in the form of claims to pos-
sessions and territory. Thus, it remains an open question whether and when a 
Serbian or Albanian scenario regarding “a new territory” will turn into an ac-
tive project, involving and destabilizing not only the parties concerned, but 
also the wider Balkan region. 
The Albanian Factor in Macedonia 
The second argument in this article aims at analyzing the extent to which an 
independent Kosovo might trigger extensive Albanian nationalism within 
neighboring countries, particularly in Macedonia. If we have in mind Ernest 
Weibel’s understanding of the Balkans,23 it is important to assess the incen-
tives of the Albanian minority in Macedonia to demand secession.  
The co-existence of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians is prob-
lematic. The gap between these two peoples is alarming, considering that Al-
banians are not satisfied with their status within the state. This has a direct 
impact upon Macedonia’s long-term stability. In 2000, the International Crisis 
Group stated that the two ethnic groups “lead very separate and distinct 
lives.”24 Since then, the situation has not improved much. Political leadership 
on both sides, while continuing privately a dialogue on improvements, “pub-
licly cater[ed] to the more extreme nationalists in their respective parties” and 
consequently positions have hardened.25 Albanians in Macedonia claim more 
rights. While arguing that Macedonians do not give them equality and have 
not implemented what they fought for and what was consequently promised 
after Macedonia had been dragged from the brink of civil war in 2001, what 
Albanians seem to advocate is a Greater Albania incorporating Albania itself, 
Kosovo, noticeable parts of Macedonia, and part of Ipiros in Greece.26 The 
                                                      
23 Weibel primarily talks about a region where the use of violence has characterized most of the 
political conflicts since the end of the Cold War. See Ernest Weibel, Histoire et géopolitique 
des Balkans de 1800 à nos jours, (Paris: Ellipses, 2000). 
24 International Crisis Group, Report No. 98, retrived 24 November 2008, from: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1162&sr=8. 
25 Ibid. 
26 For example, Ramiz Alia points out that in the late 19th century security threats on Albanian 
minorities already triggered an attempt to create a large, strong state including the entire ethnic 
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possibility of creating Greater Albania implies analysis about differences and 
similarities among Albanians inhabiting various states in the Balkans.  
In her analysis, Antonina Zhelyazkova notes that “the Albanians in Mac-
edonia are definitely more conservative and less educated than the Kosovars 
and the Albanians from Albania. Along with this … the Macedonian Albani-
ans are richer than the Kosovars, who, on their part, are much richer than the 
population in Albania.”27 Although these differences may question the even-
tual interest in creating Greater Albania, at least under current circumstances, 
in order to understand whether Macedonian Albanians support Kosovo’s in-
dependence, Zhelyazkova concludes that the Albanian intellectual elite in 
Macedonia was “euphorically eager to see the establishment of independent 
Kosovo,” perceiving it as an opportunity to move and work.28  
The Albanian minority aimed at undermining stability in Macedonia 
which would affect the Balkan region as a whole and in this regard. Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver’s theory of Regional Security Complexes seems to be 
a valuable tool to assess the impact of an independent Kosovo on the Alba-
nian nationalist movement.29 Within this conceptual framework, assessing the 
impact of the independence of Kosovo for Albanian communities in the Bal-
kans can be done by assessing the effect of such independence on both of am-
ity/enmity and security issues such as balance of power. One of the main im-
pacts of Kosovo’s independence on the creation of the pattern of amity with 
both Albania and the Albanian minority in Macedonia is the end of the repres-
sion of Albanian culture in the former Serbian province. Jean-Louis Dufour 
points out indicators which show that prior to the NATO intervention, Serbian 
central authority was oppressing any demonstration of Albanian language and 
                                                                                                                                 
group after the Ottoman Empire’s withdrawal from the Balkans. See R. Alia, The Albanian 
League of Prizren: A Brilliant Page of Our History Written in Blood (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1978). 
27 A. Zhelyazkova, “Macedonia and Kosovo after the military operations,” retrieved 15 August 
2007, from: http://www.omda.bg/imir/mk_social2.html. 
28 Ibid. 
29 This theory is aimed at understanding how a set of units whose major processes including 
securitization, desecuritization, or both, are interlinked in a manner that their security problems 
cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. See B. Buzan and O. 
Wæver, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 201. Later, 
in their 2003 volume, the authors noted that such a theory is not only an efficient model seeking 
to provide an efficient “matrix for area studies,” but it is also a composite approach using both 
constructivism, to understand and assess the occurrence of “durable pattern of amity and 
enmity,” and realism, to understand issues such as “anarchic structure and its balance of power 
consequences, and … pressures of local geographical proximity” where enmity is at stake 
(Buzan and Wæver, op. cit., 45–51). 
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culture, as well as radio and cinema diffusion, publishing, and education.30 
But relieved from Serbian pressure while administrated by the UNMIK, Ko-
sovo has seen its Albanian ethnic majority expressing its own culture in a 
growing manner. The renewal of education in the Albanian language, com-
plemented with close economic, cultural, and professional links to both Alba-
nia and the Albanian minority in Macedonia, could be the ground for a rein-
forced shared identity by elites among national boundaries.  
Accordingly, Albanian responsibility in regard to independent Kosovo 
lies in the idea of not being overambitious and having other territorial preten-
sions, in this case in Macedonia. In his analysis, Charles Kupchan argues that 
independent Kosovo “promises to stabilize Macedonia by forestalling the 
radicalization of its ethnic Albanians and neutralizing Albanian extremists 
throughout the region,” but in the end it is Macedonian responsibility and be-
havior towards its Albanian minority “that will do more to stabilize (or desta-
bilize) the country than developments elsewhere.”31 The argument offered by 
Zhelyazkova goes further by acknowledging that “Macedonia is not the alter-
native for the Kosovars” due to significant differences including moderniza-
tion, religion, culture, and mentality.32 In fact, the author concludes that nei-
ther Albanian community expresses a desire for unification in a common state 
but it is “only on a political and ideological level where the idea for a united 
Great Albania is not strange.” Moreover, such an opinion is characteristic of 
the elite circles in Albania, while educated people in Kosovo and Macedonia 
think differently: they rather count on “facilitating borders in the far future, 
and in the near future they hope for joint activities in independent Kosovo.”33 
This is a reasonable standpoint considering that Macedonia itself can do 
nothing about the events in Kosovo. As argued by the International Crisis 
Group,  
 
the Kosovo crisis exposed many of the fundamental divisions be-
tween the country’s ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians … Al-
most all ethnic Albanians in Macedonia believe that the conflict in 
Kosovo was necessary and worthwhile as it brought about the “liber-
ation” of Kosovo from Belgrade’s control. Ethnic Macedonians, how-
ever, worry that growing demands for the independence of Kosovo 
                                                      
30 J.-L. Dufour, Les crises internationals de Pékin (1900) à Bagdad (2004) (Paris: Editions 
Complexe, 2004), 288. 
31 C. A. Kupchan, op. cit. 
32 A. Zhelyazkova, op. cit. 
33 Ibid. 
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will encourage similar territorial aspirations among Albanians in 
Macedonia.34 
 
Today when Kosovo is independent such worries are still valid. Yet an-
other point worth discussion is that Kosovo’s independence, gained through 
the use of war, might be perceived as an example by the Albanian minority in 
Macedonia. This supposition is supported by the occurrence of the 2001 in-
surgency in Macedonia during which Macedonian factions of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), influenced by the Kosovo experience, tried to claim 
the independence of northern parts of the country featuring Albanian ethnic 
background. In a perspective suggested by Charles Tilly where states make 
wars and war makes states, the fight for independence inspired by the Kosovo 
conflict of 1998–99 might create preconditions for a trans-Albanian shared 
identity and proto-state structures.35 This would, however, contribute to the 
realization of a Greater Albania. 
The independence of Kosovo may also trigger enmity between the Alba-
nian population and other local ethnic groups, especially the Serbs and the 
Macedonians. First, the independence of Kosovo stresses dramatically the 
pattern of enmity with its powerful Serbian neighbor. Dufour points out that 
the latter has already shown its interest for this territory under its own ruling 
power by the use of force during the 1999 conflict with the KLA and the 
NATO forces.36 As of the present, Serbia has not recognized Kosovo 
independence so far, and there is no prospect for it: “For as long as the Ser-
bian nation exists, Kosovo will remain Serbia” were the words pronounced by 
Vojislav Koštunica, the former Serbian Prime Minister. Furthermore, the 
specter of the independence of Kosovo triggered an important political crisis 
in Serbia, leading to the dissolution of parliament.37 With confusing electoral 
results in May 2008, it is still not clear whether or not the crisis caused by 
Kosovo’s independence increased radical or extremist anti-Kosovo positions 
within the Serbian political spectrum.  
Second, for Buzan and Wæver, in a region where one group’s cohesion is 
reinforced but its patterns of enmity with others are stressed, realist security 
issues such as balance of power are reactivated.38 Accordingly, the strategic 
                                                      
34 International Crisis Group, Report No. 98, op. cit. 
35 C. Tilly, Contrainte et capital dans formation de l’Europe 990–1990 (Paris: Aubier 1992). 
36 J.-L. Dufour, op. cit., 289. 
37 Agence France Presse, “Le Premier ministre serbe dissout le gouvernement,” retrieved 10 
July 2008, from: http://www.france24.com. 
38 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, op. cit., 2003, 45. 
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weakness of Kosovo and Albanian minorities in Macedonia may encourage 
them to search for security by building a larger political entity with Albania. 
Indeed, as Dufour put it, during the 1998 fights between the KLA and the 
Serbian security forces, the lack of military assets and heavy weapons on the 
Albanian side led to rapid and almost complete military demise, equivalent to 
“a military suicide” only stopped by the NATO intervention.39 The failure of a 
Macedonian faction of the KLA also showed the same level of military weak-
ness. From a strategic point of view, the union of weak Albanian actors could 
be a way to balance weaknesses of security forces and prevent perceived Ser-
bian or Macedonian threats.40 
This part of the article shows that the Albanian population spread over the 
Balkan states has incentives for growing a common identity, but in a rela-
tional pattern of enmity with Serbs and Macedonians, while looking to unite 
and secure their own defense. Given this picture, only the integration or coop-
eration with the European Union seems to be able to stabilize the area and 
remove any incentives for an extended Albanian state—a project that can only 
be developed through the use of violence. Close cooperation with the EU is 
not only a rational security guarantee, but also a promise to become a part of 
the Regional Security Complex based on a pattern of amity and on rules that 
completely exclude the use of force to serve political goals. Just as the Euro-
pean Union created the right conditions for a sustainable peace in Europe after 
the World War II, it is likely that today the same institution can help serving 
the same goal in the Balkans. 
Serbs in Bosnia and Serbs in Kosovo: Direct Linkage 
The last argument of this article focuses on Serbs in Republika Srpska who 
have not excluded the possibility of demanding secession from Bosnia-Herze-
govina since the independence of Kosovo became a reality. Thinking in such 
a direction is dangerous, as it could challenge both the 1995 Dayton-created 
peace in Bosnia and the stability of the wider Balkan region. Assessing the 
quality of the Dayton Agreement, Susan Woodward argues that although it 
ended the war in Bosnia, it “did not provide an executive authority to make 
                                                      
39 J-L. Dufour, op. cit., 288–94. 
40 The weak security condition tormenting Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia is also 
reinforced by the fact that their territories do not provide any sea access. Such a configuration 
is not an existential threat for groups who do not have capacities to develop and sustain a navy. 
Nonetheless, it significantly increases the Albanian population’s sensitivity to any Serbian or 
Macedonian blockade or denial of resources. Furthermore, the absence of sea access makes 
NATO-like support operations more complex. 
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policy decisions, resolve differences, or define real strategy for peace.”41 
Thus, since then the overall situation and future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 
country consisting of a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation and Bosnian-Serb gov-
erned Republika Srpska, has been subject to further analysis. This was mostly 
due to the disputable nature of the Dayton Agreement which created artificial 
borders within Bosnia and accentuated “the deep divisions within the coun-
try.”42  
From the current perspective, while wishing to support their orthodox 
brothers ultimately driven to demand autonomy or self-determination from the 
newly created state of Kosovo, Republika Srpska may decide to benefit from 
the weakness of the Dayton Agreement and demand secession from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and consequently link itself to Serbia. In fact, Adam Raviv 
points out that “the civil part of the implementation is much harder and slower 
than the military one”—a component which may additionally encourage sepa-
ration.43 Moreover, in his study, Sumantra Bose analyzes the constitution of 
the Republika Srpska and concludes that “the main goal of [its] framers is to 
convey that the RS closely approximates a sovereign state.”44 If created to 
become a sovereign state, then it is just a matter of time before the realization 
may begin.  
The independence of Kosovo was followed by numerous protests in both 
Serbia and Republika Srpska. Consequently, on 21 February 2008, the par-
liament of the Republika Srpska adopted a resolution enabling the RS author-
ities to organize a referendum to push for secession of the RS from Bosnia in 
case the international community recognized independence of Kosovo. Brani-
slav Dukić, leader of the Serb Movement of Independent Associations 
(SPONA), called Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, to 
include a referendum on RS independence in his electoral campaign. Even 
more, as a response to Kosovo’s independence, from Dukić’s standpoint, the 
Bosnian Serbs “shall request independence for the Serb Republic as well. If 
Kosovo’s illegal parliament can proclaim independence, the Bosnian Serb 
legal parliament should immediately proclaim independence for Republika 
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Srpska without calling for a referendum.”45 Such a drastic position to confront 
a newly created state corresponds to how the Serbian Radical Party perceives 
the future of RS—in its unity with Serbia. In a 1998 interview entitled “Day-
ton and Democracy,” Nikola Poplašen, leader of the Serbian Radical Party in 
RS, stressed that  
 
some political or historical goals may be achieved in five, ten, or 
twenty years …. The existence of the Serbian people in Republika 
Srpska and in other countries in the Balkans is possible and will be 
prosperous only on the condition that other peoples who live in the 
Balkans live in peace …. I cannot decide whether Republika Srpska 
will unite with Serbia, or whether Bosnia will become stronger, in ten 
years or so, but all the people who live here must make that decision 
in a legitimate and democratic way.46 
 
The above quoted interview clearly suggested the uncertainty of the future 
of the Republika Srpska. In order to understand direct linkage between Serbs 
in Bosnia and Serbs in Kosovo, Neven Andjelić goes back to the period be-
fore the 1998 conflict in Kosovo and concludes that the linkage is not a recent 
phenomenon, but rather something that had already existed: “There was pres-
sure from Serbia to stage meetings in Bosnia-Herzegovina to support fellow 
Serbs in Kosovo. It did not come from official institutions in Serbia, but from 
individuals and groups. However, they were supported in every sense by the 
Serbian communists.”47 Today, such a relationship is confirmed even more by 
Kosovo independence. Serbs remaining in Kosovo have full support from 
Serbs in Bosnia whatever their decision might be.  
Thus, the question of responsibility in this case is a conundrum, with 
opinion divided between the parties concerned. Dismembering Bosnia-Herze-
govina would mean going back to the period of the collapse of Yugoslavia. It 
is true that while using the terminology of the peace process and reconcilia-
tion, the international community has been involved in changing the country, 
although its presence has very often been perceived as an external imposition 
of what is to be done and what is not. While certain improvements including 
tax reform, police reform, the development of a national security and defense 
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system, and the capture of war criminals have been acknowledged, Dominik 
Zaum is suspicious about the degree and the way the international community 
should be involved in solving Bosnian problems.48 Although the international 
community has done much, there was minimal local ownership and participa-
tion in the reform processes. For Zaum, “such lack of local ownership is in-
dicative of an approach to policymaking by states and organizations involved 
in state-building missions that perceives the problem of state-building to be 
technical, rather than political,” and thus his main criticism is directed to-
wards the international community which prioritized the technical nature of 
the problem over the political one.49  
Accordingly, an independent Kosovo can find itself in a similar situation 
if the international community opts for an inadequate approach. To what ex-
tent the international community is capable of dealing with post-independence 
Kosovo and contributing to a lasting peace between the Serbian minority and 
Albanians is another issue worthy of consideration. In their analysis, Denisa 
Kostovicova and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, identify the EU as an actor bear-
ing a remarkable responsibility for both failure and success in the Balkans. 
They voice their criticism by looking at the EU’s “lack of transnational di-
mension in dealing with the region …. The EU has not managed to tackle the 
source of strength of the region’s shady transnational networks.”50 Thus, it is 
the EU with its approach which can help overcome the problems from the past 
and accommodate the still existing differences. A civil society can also play a 
valuable role. For Ana Dević, the challenges civil society faces are alarming 
as they are often involved in “parallel structures” and thus in an “antipolitics 
model” working for one side’s benefits—a model making cooperation 
between constituent groups of the civil society harder, if not impossible.51 
Moreover, whether the EU-led mission in Kosovo or greater civil society 
involvement, or both, will play the leading role in the Balkans and thus 
generate peace and stability in both post-Dayton Bosnia and post-independent 
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Kosovo is a matter of conjecture, currently in many circles considered a 
dangerous topic to discuss. 
Conclusions 
This article has explored three different scenarios in regard to the current situ-
ation characterizing independent Kosovo. The first argument offered a wider 
understanding of how the Serbian minority may reject the independence of the 
province and use available tools to demand a closer linkage with Serbia. Fol-
lowing on from this, Serbian and Albanian responsibilities have been exam-
ined: while the Serbian one lies in being opened up for greater inclusion and 
cooperation within separated Kosovo, the Albanian side’s main responsibility 
is the establishment of a functioning state based on democratic institutions 
capable of fighting organized crime and corruption while reducing poverty 
and unemployment rates. In order to encourage Serbs to remain, as suggested 
by Kupchan, “ethnic Albanian leaders will need to capitalize on the prospect 
of independence to promote tolerance and protect minority rights.”52  
The second argument discussed the consequences an independent Kosovo 
may have on encouraging a pan-Albanian nationalist movement, and conse-
quently separatist tendencies in northern Macedonia. Having examined re-
sponsibilities deriving from both Albanian and Macedonian parties in regard 
to post-independence Kosovo, it demonstrated that being overambitious (es-
pecially in terms of territorial pretensions) can lead to another conflict. Here, 
as in any other sensitive issue in the Balkans, the international community is 
required to react by using adept diplomacy while coordinating its actions with 
leaderships from the countries in the Balkan region.  
The third argument considered the situation in post-Dayton Bosnia and 
how the Serbian part of it may react in relation to the position of the Serbian 
minority within independent Kosovo. While acknowledging the unstable situ-
ation in Bosnia, the argument pointed out that dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina 
along ethnic lines could generate a new conflict similar to the one former Yu-
goslavia faced in 1991. Once again, the responsibility for avoiding the spread 
of new violence is to be divided between the local parties supported by ade-
quate but limited international assistance. 
Overall, while having in mind the responsibilities each party is subjected 
to, if one conclusion is to be drawn from the arguments elaborated, it would 
be that the most likely way to achieve stability in the Balkans is its integration 
in the European Union framework. In addition, as stated by Human Rights 
Watch, while Kosovo is de facto independent, it remains “imperative that Ko-
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sovo authorities and the EU-led mission protect minorities from the violence 
that has been a persistent feature of Kosovo’s post-war history.”53 In the case 
of Kosovo, one hopes that the process of structural change aimed at securing a 
better future starts as soon as possible without negative implications for other 
Balkan states. 
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